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Abstract 
Cognitive flexibility refers to the ability to quickly reconfigure our mind, like when we 
switch between different tasks. This review highlights recent evidence showing that 
cognitive flexibility can be conditioned by simple incentives typically known to drive 
lower-level learning, such as stimulus-response associations. Cognitive flexibility can 
also become associated with, and triggered by, bottom-up contextual cues in our 
environment, including subliminal cues. Therefore, we suggest that the control 
functions that mediate cognitive flexibility are grounded in, and guided by, basic 
associative learning mechanisms, and abide by the same learning principles as more 
low-level forms of behavior. Such a learning perspective on cognitive flexibility offers 
new directions and important implications for further research, theory, and applications. 
 
Keywords: Cognitive flexibility, Cognitive control, Associative learning, 
Reinforcement learning, Task switching 
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Much of human behavior is characterized by the extraordinary ability to quickly 
reconfigure our mind, and switch between different tasks: We can swiftly shift our 
focus from color and fabric, when sorting dirty clothes for laundry, to shape, when 
searching for socks in a pile of clothes fresh from the dryer. This ability, often referred 
to as cognitive flexibility, has been widely recognized as a core function of cognitive 
control (Diamond, 2013), is of increasing importance in this digital age of multi-tasking 
(Eshet-Alkalai, 2004), and anomalies in flexibility are thought to characterize various 
clinical disorders (Geurts et al., 2009; Meiran et al., 2011). Cognitive flexibility has 
been studied on many different levels, including individual differences (Hommel & 
Colzato, 2017) and developmental changes (Dajani & Uddin, 2015). However, while 
most psychologists agree on the kind of behaviors that require cognitive flexibility, we 
know little about how this control function is regulated: how do we know when to be 
flexible, and how much?  
Here, we will highlight recent work from the task switching literature that offers 
important new insights into how cognitive flexibility might be controlled. Specifically, 
after a brief introduction on cognitive flexibility and task switching, we will review 
evidence showing that the high-level ability to reconfigure the mind can be conditioned 
by simple incentives, and triggered by contextual features in our environment, possibly 
even outside awareness. Finally, building on these findings, we will promote a learning 
perspective on cognitive flexibility.  
 
Cognitive flexibility: the pinnacle of cognitive control? 
According to Diamond (2013), cognitive flexibility is one of the three core 
cognitive control (or executive) functions, next to inhibition and working memory. 
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Cognitive control mechanisms allow us to use internal goals and current context to 
guide information processing “top down” (e.g., Miller & Cohen, 2001). For example, 
we can combine the contextual information of seeing a traffic agent with our goal of 
personal safety to impose a new set of rules on how we link stimuli to actions (i.e., 
focus on the agent’s hands rather than the malfunctioning traffic lights). Imposing 
control in this manner involves overriding well-learned, habitual actions (e.g., braking 
when the traffic light turns red) and, accordingly, cognitive control has traditionally 
been seen as diametrically opposed to basic associative learning mechanisms that 
mediate the binding of stimuli to responses in routine behavior (Norman & Shallice, 
1986). While associative learning is generally thought to produce fast, automatized 
stimulus-response links that can run unsupervised (and possibly unconsciously), 
cognitive control is thought to require volition and attention to produce slow but 
strategic action (e.g., Norman & Shallice, 1986; Diamond, 2013).  
In this conceptualization, cognitive flexibility may possibly be considered the 
pinnacle of cognitive control: Other control processes are important to maintain and 
protect our current goals and task sets (e.g., by selectively attending to goal-relevant 
stimuli and inhibiting habitual responses), but it is one's overarching ability to flexibly 
change these goals and task sets that produces adaptive behavior. Cognitive flexibility 
can thus be seen as a form of “meta-control” (Goschke, 2003; Hommel, 2015). 
However, casting cognitive flexibility as a higher-order control process naturally invites 
the question of how this ability to change task sets is regulated: Absent the assumption 
of a homunculus, what controls cognitive flexibility? Intriguingly, recent work suggests 
that flexibility can in fact be guided by “low-level” associative learning processes. 
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Task switching as a marker of cognitive flexibility 
Our brief review will focus on regulation of cognitive flexibility in the context of 
studies investigating task switching (for reviews, see Kiesel et al., 2010; 
Vandierendonck et al., 2010). Cognitive flexibility has also been studied using creative 
problem solving, or rule reversal learning paradigms, like the Wisconscin Card Sorting 
Test. However, these paradigms provide less experimenter control over when the actual 
change in task sets occurred (see also, Geurts et al., 2009). There is also conceptual 
overlap between task-switching research and the study of working memory updating, 
though the latter tends to focus primarily on changing “items” in (declarative) working 
memory than on changing (procedural) task rules (Hazy et al., 2006). 
The task switching literature investigates switching between task sets. Task sets can 
be considered a configuration of context-dependent production (“if, then”) rules that are 
actively maintained in order to guide our current behavior. For example, when we want 
to call our friend, we use a given set of rules to navigate through our phone, which 
define our task set. While certain components are often shared across task sets, it is their 
associations with the different rules and goals that make task sets unique (e.g., pushing a 
number to dial a phone number versus pushing a number to change floors in an 
elevator).  
Using paradigms in which participants have to switch between two or more tasks, 
task switching studies typically focus on the switch cost: slower and less accurate 
performance on task switches than task repetitions. The switch cost has been interpreted 
as an index of cognitive control processes required for reconfiguring the task set 
(Rogers & Monsell, 1995) and/or resolving interference from the previously active task 
  
6 
  
set (Allport et al., 1994). As a more tonic and voluntary marker of cognitive flexibility, 
recent studies have also begun emphasizing the switch rate: how much people choose to 
switch tasks in a free choice environment (Arrington & Logan, 2004).  
A possible role for associative learning in task-switching was initially only 
investigated at the level of task sets: studies showed that task sets can be bound to, and 
be primed by, task-relevant (e.g., Waszak, Hommel, & Allport, 2003) and -irrelevant 
stimuli (e.g., Mayr & Bryck, 2007), and can be reinforced following reward feedback 
(e.g., Schiffer et al., 2014), similar to stimulus-response associations (for a review, see 
Abrahamse et al., 2016). More recently though, there has been a realization that learning 
may not only promote the retrieval of one task set over another, but could also modulate 
the preparedness to switch sets per se. For instance, Dreisbach and Haider (2006) 
observed that a higher switch-likelihood (a higher proportion of task switches vs. 
repetitions in a block of trials) resulted in reduced switch costs. This opened the door to 
asking whether “low-level” learning mechanisms can shape cognitive flexibility.  
 
Cognitive flexibility can be conditioned 
Cognitive control functions are assumed crucial for overriding habitual behavior, 
like strongly conditioned responses, but can control functions themselves be subject to 
conditioning by reward? Although recent research has begun to investigate interactions 
between cognitive control and reward processing (for reviews, Botvinick & Braver, 
2015; Notebaert & Braem, 2015), most of these studies presented explicit reward 
motivation cues before task execution, thus focusing on the effects of anticipating 
reward on cognitive control. Possibly, this focus on explicit reward cues was motivated 
by the idea that top-down, strategic control processes can only be up-regulated 
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proactively by explicit, preparatory cues. In contrast, the reinforcement learning 
literature usually focuses on the (automatic) strengthening of behavior following reward 
feedback (Sutton & Barto, 1998).  
As a first step towards connecting these disparate literatures (see also, Umemoto & 
Holroyd, 2015), we recently demonstrated that the act of task switching can be 
conditioned by reward (Braem, 2017). In a first phase of the experiment, cues told 
participants which task had to be performed on each trial (i.e., cued task phase), and 
people were rewarded more when performing a task switch than a task repetition 
(Figure 1A). In a second phase, participants were free to choose which task to perform, 
and no more rewards were delivered. Interestingly, despite the fact that participants 
were unaware of the biased reward allocation in the first phase, they now showed more 
voluntary task switching behavior (Figure 1B), suggesting that cognitive flexibility can 
be conditioned. In a similar vein, another recent study showed that presenting 
participants with more task switches than repetitions during a cued task phase, 
influenced subjects’ choice to be more flexible in a subsequent voluntary task choice 
environment (i.e., performing more voluntary task switches; Fröber & Dreisbach, 2017).  
Together, these studies suggest that the choice to be cognitively flexible is very 
susceptible to its recent (reinforcement) learning history. These studies are also 
congruent with a much older line of research in behavioral psychology, where (animal) 
psychologists demonstrated that variability in behavior (i.e., responding in a less 
predictable manner) is a behavior that in itself can be selectively reinforced (for a 
review, see Neuringer, 2002). Future studies should address whether this type of 
reinforced behavioral variability relies on the same mechanisms as those underlying 
task switching.  
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Figure 1: An illustration of the studies by Braem (2017) and Chiu and Egner (2017, Experiment 
3). A. In Braem (2017), participants had to categorize words according to animacy (living or 
non-living) or size (larger or smaller than a basketball), depending on whether the task cue was 
a vowel or a consonant. Unbeknownst to them, depending on which group they were assigned 
to, they had an increased chance of obtaining a big reward following task switches versus task 
repetitions. In a second phase, no more rewards were given and participants were free which 
task to perform. B. The group rewarded more for task alternations showed more spontaneous 
task switching performance. C. In Chiu & Egner (2017), participants had to perform one out of 
three tasks (categorizing faces according to gender, age, or emotion) depending on the color 
surrounding a picture of a face. Crucially, some faces were presented more when tasks 
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switched, while others were presented more when tasks repeated. D. The pictures associated to a 
higher likelihood of task switching showed increased task switching performance (i.e., smaller 
task switch costs). Reprinted with permission. 
 
Cognitive flexibility can be triggered by contextual cues 
A traditional assumption of cognitive flexibility (and cognitive control more 
broadly) is that it is generalizable. Thus, the processes responsible for task switching are 
not thought to be specific to particular tasks but to be shared among all possible task 
switching conditions. Consequently, many scholars have hypothesized that the effects 
of training people on being more cognitively flexible in one task context should transfer 
to other tasks measuring cognitive flexibility. However, recent meta-analyses have 
demonstrated that cognitive training studies rarely find transfer (e.g., Simons et al., 
2016). 
In contrast, associative learning processes are thought to be trigger-specific in 
nature, as learned associations are known to bind to the context in which they occur 
(Pearce & Bouton, 2001). In behavioral psychology, this is often referred to as stimulus 
control, but we will speak of the context-specificity of learned behavior. For example, 
the habit of smoking can be very context-specific: environments that have been more 
frequently associated with smoking in the past will induce a higher urge to smoke, 
independent of the availability of cigarettes (Dols, van den Hout, Kindt, & Willems, 
2002). Intriguingly, recent studies have documented that the same class of phenomena 
can be observed in relation to cognitive control settings. For instance, if a spatial 
context (like screen location) is predictive of more challenging task demands, over time 
this high-demand context comes to implicitly cue the retrieval of the appropriate 
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attentional set, thus making participants better at meeting high task demands in that 
spatial context (for reviews, see Bugg & Crump, 2012; Egner, 2014).  
Importantly, recent studies have extended these findings of “context-control 
learning” to the case of cognitive flexibility. For example, it has been shown that switch 
costs can be reduced for stimuli that are presented at a screen location associated with a 
higher likelihood of task switches (relative to repetitions), even when people are 
unaware of this contingency (Crump & Logan, 2010; for a similar observation in 
attention shifting, see Sali, Anderson, & Yantis, 2015). In a similar vein, Farooqui and 
Manly (2015) demonstrated that subliminally presented (i.e., not consciously perceived) 
cues signaling a higher likelihood of task switches were followed by smaller task switch 
costs.  
If the readiness to switch between different tasks can be triggered by contextual 
cues, like location, it should also be possible to bind switch-readiness to specific task 
stimuli. We tested this hypothesis by linking particular stimuli to the need to update 
tasks more or less frequently (Chiu & Egner, 2017; see also Leboe et al., 2008). By 
employing three different task sets (see Figure 1C), we could demonstrate that stimuli 
(here, specific individuals’ faces) associated with task switches did indeed facilitate task 
switching, and that they did so irrespective of which task was being switched to (Figure 
1D). This suggests that what participants learned was to associate specific cues with a 
general readiness to switch between tasks rather than to switch to one particular 
alternative task. This finding emphasizes a key distinction in the effects of learned 
stimulus-control vs. stimulus-response associations: while the latter are specific (e.g., 
promoting a particular motor response), the former are generalizable (here, aiding the 
switch to any other task) (Egner, 2014). The extent of this generalizability (e.g., to other 
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measures of cognitive flexibility), however, remains an interesting avenue for future 
research. 
Taken together, these findings show that, through learning, stimuli in our 
environment can be bound to the processes underlying cognitive flexibility (e.g., to an 
“updating threshold”, cf. Goschke, 2003), and eventually help triggering cognitive 
flexibility bottom-up, even subliminally. By relying on these fast associative learning 
processes, the contextual triggering of cognitive flexibility may allow for a more 
efficient and less effortful allocation of control strategies. 
 
A learning perspective on cognitive flexibility 
In trying to answer what controls cognitive flexibility, the above studies 
demonstrate that, much like simple motor responses, cognitive flexibility is highly 
sensitive to the environment it operates in, and rewards that follow it. However, in our 
view, the impact of these findings has remained underappreciated in the broader 
literature, likely because they do not fit with more traditional notions of cognitive 
control as being in competition with bottom-up associative behavior. Many 
psychologists still ascribe cognitive flexibility to independent, supervisory, or 
"executive" control systems that correct low-level behavior, without specifying 
regulatory mechanisms for employing these functions in an adaptive manner (e.g., 
Diamond, 2013).  
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Figure 2: An illustration of a more traditional view versus a learning perspective on cognitive 
flexibility. The left side shows a more traditional view, where stimulus-response learning and 
more abstract task sets are thought to be supervised by an independent set of cognitive control 
functions. The right side depicts a learning perspective, which emphasizes the grounding of 
cognitive control in associative learning. In both views, cognitive flexibility describes the 
general ability to flexibly switch between different concepts or task sets, and would result from 
one or more control functions/representations. Therefore, a learning perspective maintains these 
same “general” control representations (or control settings), but their context-specificity or lack 
of transfer is explained by their associations with more low-level features of information 
processing, rather than, for example, a multitude of different control functions for each context 
separately. This depiction is only meant to illustrate a way of thinking on cognitive control (for 
related illustrations and arguments, see Abrahamse et al., 2016; Eisenreich et al., 2017). 
 
Instead, we believe that these findings call for an alternative perspective where the 
functions which allow us to be flexible are guided by basic (associative) learning, and 
abide by the same learning principles as more low-level forms of behavior do. This 
view is consistent with recent theoretical perspectives on the regulation of other control 
functions, like conflict-control (Abrahamse, Braem, Notebaert, & Verguts, 2016; Egner, 
Supervisory control functions
Traditional view on cognitive flexibility Learning perspective on cognitive control
Integrated control representations
Stimulus representations Response representations Stimulus representations Response representations
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2014), which has been effectively modeled using basic reinforcement learning rules 
(e.g., Botvinick et al., 2001). The basic premise of this perspective is that, rather than 
seeing cognitive flexibility as originating from a standalone module (or brain region) 
that intervenes - deus ex machina – to solve problems in lower-level associative 
processing, the processes underlying cognitive flexibility are grounded in the learning 
framework (and associative network) as simple stimulus-response associations (Figure 
2). Thus, while cognitive control processes are “higher-level” in that they can produce 
generalizable benefits, their regulation must be understood in terms of basic associative 
learning processes.  
 
Conclusion 
In sum, we aimed to illustrate how recent observations break with traditional ideas 
on cognitive flexibility, by showing how cognitive flexibility can be conditioned and 
bound to contextual cues. We believe the literature is in need of a paradigmatic shift in 
how psychologists understand cognitive flexibility, and cognitive control more broadly.  
A learning perspective on cognitive flexibility could provide new challenges for 
computational models of task switching (e.g., Holroyd & McClure, 2015), and 
theorizing about impairments in cognitive flexibility in certain neurocognitive disorders 
(e.g., autism, Geurts et al., 2009; OCD or depression, Meiran et al., 2011). Moreover, 
the conditioning and contextual cuing of cognitive flexibility could also offer promising 
applications for facilitating behavioral change, as other forms of conditioning have (e.g., 
De Houwer et al., 2001). For example, in training people to be more cognitively 
flexible, one could take advantage of its context-sensitivity by training people in the 
environments where flexibility is most required. Last, we only focused on learning via 
  
14 
  
experience, but recent studies have shown that learning via instructions can also result 
in automatic stimulus-response associations (e.g., Meiran, Liefooghe, & De Houwer, 
2017). Therefore, an interesting hypothesis to test would be whether instructed 
stimulus-control assocations would also result in the kind of automaticity reviewed 
here.   
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Recommended Reading 
 
Abrahamse, E., Braem, S., Notebaert, W., & Verguts, T. (See References). Provides a 
more comprehensive review of the empirical literature, and outlines the broader 
implications of an associative learning perspective on cognitive control. 
Egner, T. (See References). Gives a more detailed description of the explanatory value 
of a learning perspective in the conflict adaptation literature, where more studies 
already investigated the context-specificity of cognitive control.  
Geurts, H. M., Corbett, B., & Solomon, M. (See References). Reviews the literature on 
cognitive flexibility from a clinical perspective (i.e., in autism), and, in doing so, 
critically evaluates the concept of cognitive flexibility and how to best study it. 
Ionescu, T. (2012). Exploring the nature of cognitive flexibility. New ideas in 
psychology, 30(2), 190-200. While outside the scope of the current brief review, this 
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theoretical review offers an interesting discussion on the different uses of the term 
cognitive flexibility (e.g., as a skill versus property of the cognitive system). 
Neuringer, A. (See References). Reviews an interesting, related line of research from 
behavioral psychology that studied the conditioning of variability in behavior. 
 
 
References 
 
Abrahamse, E., Braem, S., Notebaert, W., & Verguts, T. (2016). Grounding cognitive 
control in associative learning. Psychological Bulletin, 142, 693-728. 
Allport, D. A., Styles, E. A. & Hsieh, S. (1994) Shifting intentional set: Exploring the 
dynamic control of tasks. In: Attention and performance XV, ed. C. Umiltà & M. 
Moscovitch. MIT Press. 
Arrington, C. M., & Logan, G. D. (2004). The cost of a voluntary task switch. 
Psychological science, 15(9), 610-615. 
Botvinick, M., & Braver, T. (2015). Motivation and cognitive control: from behavior to 
neural mechanism. Annual review of psychology, 66. 
Botvinick, M. M., Braver, T. S., Barch, D. M., Carter, C. S., & Cohen, J. D. (2001). 
Conflict monitoring and cognitive control. Psychological review, 108(3), 624. 
Braem, S. (2017). Conditioning task switching behavior. Cognition, 166, 272-276. 
Bugg, J. M., & Crump, M. J. (2012). In support of a distinction between voluntary and 
stimulus-driven control: A review of the literature on proportion congruent effects. 
Frontiers in psychology, 3, 367. 
  
16 
  
Chiu, Y. C., & Egner, T. (2017). Cueing Cognitive Flexibility: Item-Specific Learning 
of Switch Readiness. Journal of experimental psychology. Human perception and 
performance. In press. 
Crump, M. J., & Logan, G. D. (2010). Contextual control over task-set retrieval. 
Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, 72(8), 2047-2053. 
Dajani, D. R., & Uddin, L. Q. (2015). Demystifying cognitive flexibility: Implications 
for clinical and developmental neuroscience. Trends in neurosciences, 38(9), 571-
578. 
De Houwer, J., Thomas, S., & Baeyens, F. (2001). Association learning of likes and 
dislikes: A review of 25 years of research on human evaluative conditioning. 
Psychological bulletin, 127(6), 853. 
Diamond, A. (2013). Executive functions. Annual review of psychology, 64, 135-168. 
Dols, M., Hout, M. V. D., Kindt, M., & Willems, B. (2002). The urge to smoke depends 
on the expectation of smoking. Addiction, 97(1), 87-93. 
Dreisbach, G., & Haider, H. (2006). Preparatory adjustment of cognitive control in the 
task switching paradigm. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 13(2), 334-338. 
Egner, T. (2014). Creatures of habit (and control): a multi-level learning perspective on 
the modulation of congruency effects. Frontiers in psychology, 5: 1247. 
Eisenreich, B. R., Akaishi, R., & Hayden, B. Y. (2017). Control without controllers: 
toward a distributed neuroscience of executive control. Journal of cognitive 
neuroscience, 29(10), 1684-1698. 
Eshet-Alkalai, Y. (2004). Digital literacy: A conceptual framework for survival skills in 
the digital era. Journal of Educational Multimedia and Hypermedia, 13(1), 93-106. 
  
17 
  
Farooqui, A. A., & Manly, T. (2015). Anticipatory control through associative learning 
of subliminal relations: invisible may be better than visible. Psychological science, 
26(3), 325-334. 
Fröber, K., & Dreisbach, G. (2017). Keep flexible–Keep switching! The influence of 
forced task switching on voluntary task switching. Cognition, 162, 48-53. 
Geurts, H. M., Corbett, B., & Solomon, M. (2009). The paradox of cognitive flexibility 
in autism. Trends in cognitive sciences, 13(2), 74-82. 
Goschke, T. (2003). Voluntary action and cognitive control from a cognitive 
neuroscience perspective. Voluntary action: Brains, minds, and sociality, 49-85. 
Oxford University Press. 
Hazy, T. E., Frank, M. J., & O’Reilly, R. C. (2006). Banishing the homunculus: making 
working memory work. Neuroscience, 139(1), 105-118. 
Holroyd, C. B., & McClure, S. M. (2015). Hierarchical control over effortful behavior 
by rodent medial frontal cortex: A computational model. Psychological Review, 
122(1), 54-83. 
Hommel, B. (2015). Between persistence and flexibility: The Yin and Yang of action 
control. In Advances in motivation science, 2, 33-67. Elsevier. 
Hommel, B., & Colzato, L. S. (2017). The social transmission of metacontrol policies: 
Mechanisms underlying the interpersonal transfer of persistence and flexibility. 
Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 81, 43-58. 
Kiesel, A., Steinhauser, M., Wendt, M., Falkenstein, M., Jost, K., Philipp, A. M., & 
Koch, I. (2010). Control and interference in task switching—A review. 
Psychological bulletin, 136(5), 849. 
  
18 
  
Leboe, J. P., Wong, J., Crump, M., & Stobbe, K. (2008). Probe-specific proportion task 
repetition effects on switching costs. Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, 70(6), 
935-945. 
Mayr, U., & Bryck, R. L. (2007). Outsourcing control to the environment: effects of 
stimulus/response locations on task selection. Psychological Research, 71(1), 107-
116. 
Meiran, N., Diamond, G. M., Toder, D., & Nemets, B. (2011). Cognitive rigidity in 
unipolar depression and obsessive compulsive disorder: Examination of task 
switching, Stroop, working memory updating and post-conflict adaptation. 
Psychiatry research, 185(1), 149-156. 
Meiran, N., Liefooghe, B., & De Houwer, J. (2017). Powerful instructions: 
Automaticity without practice. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 26(6), 
509-514. 
Miller, E. K., & Cohen, J. D. (2001). An integrative theory of prefrontal cortex function. 
Annual review of neuroscience, 24(1), 167-202. 
Neuringer, A. (2002). Operant variability: Evidence, functions, and theory. 
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 9(4), 672-705. 
Norman, D. A., & Shallice, T. (1986). Attention to action. In Consciousness and self-
regulation, 1-18. Springer US. 
Notebaert, W., & Braem, S. (2015). Parsing the effects of reward on cognitive control. 
In T. Braver (Ed.), Motivation and cognitive control, 105-122, Taylor & Francis. 
Pearce, J. M., & Bouton, M. E. (2001). Theories of associative learning in animals. 
Annual review of psychology, 52(1), 111-139. 
  
19 
  
Rogers, R. D., & Monsell, S. (1995). Costs of a predictible switch between simple 
cognitive tasks. Journal of experimental psychology: General, 124(2), 207. 
Sali, A. W., Anderson, B. A., & Yantis, S. (2015). Learned states of preparatory 
attentional control. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and 
Cognition, 41(6), 1790. 
Schiffer, A. M., Muller, T., Yeung, N., & Waszak, F. (2014). Reward activates 
stimulus-specific and task-dependent representations in visual association cortices. 
Journal of Neuroscience, 34(47), 15610-15620. 
Simons, D. J., Boot, W. R., Charness, N., Gathercole, S. E., Chabris, C. F., Hambrick, 
D. Z., & Stine-Morrow, E. A. (2016). Do “brain-training” programs work?. 
Psychological Science in the Public Interest, 17(3), 103-186. 
Sutton, R. S., & Barto, A. G. (1998). Reinforcement learning: An introduction (Vol. 1, 
No. 1). Cambridge: MIT press. 
Umemoto, A., & Holroyd, C. B. (2015). Task-specific effects of reward on task 
switching. Psychological research, 79(4), 698-707. 
Vandierendonck, A., Liefooghe, B., & Verbruggen, F. (2010). Task switching: interplay 
of reconfiguration and interference control. Psychological bulletin, 136(4), 601. 
Waszak, F., Hommel, B., & Allport, A. (2003). Task-switching and long-term priming: 
Role of episodic stimulus–task bindings in task-shift costs. Cognitive psychology, 
46(4), 361-413. 
